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Abstract
This article explores the connection between boolean-valued class
models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly
Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis
that the set theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary
entity, which can in turn be taken to consist of arbitrary objects, viz.
arbitrary sets.
1 Introduction
Contemporary philosophy of physics aims to develop metaphysical in-
terpretations of fundamental current physical theories. In philosophy of
quantum mechanics, for instance, researchers articulate metaphysical ac-
counts of what the physical world at the micro-level could be like given our
current quantum mechanical theories. In this article, I want to do some-
thing similar for set theory. My aim is to articulate a new metaphysical
view of what the set theoretic world could be like given our current set
theoretic theories and practices.
∗Early versions of this article were presented at the conference on Abstract Objects and
Circularity (LMU Mu¨nchen, 6 July 2019) and at the conference on Set Theory: Bridging
Mathematics and Philosophy, Universita¨t Konstanz, 28 July 2019). Thanks to Giorgio Ven-
turi, Hazel Brickhill, Sam Roberts, Joan Bagaria, Carolin Antos, Neil Barton, Chris Scam-
bler, and Toby Meadows for invaluable comments on the proposal that is developed in
this article.
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The most important development in set theory since the second world
war is Cohen’s discovery of forcing, which is an incredibly powerful and
flexible technique for producing independence results. There are twomain
approaches to forcing. The first approach, originating with [Cohen 1963],
[Cohen 1964], is sometimes called the forcing poset approach. The second
approach is called the boolean-valued approach. It was pioneered by Scott
and Solovay (and independently discovered by Vope˘nka), and was first
described in [Scott 1967]. There is a strong sense in which the two ap-
proaches are ultimately mathematically equivalent.
The boolean-valued approach, at least in its modern incarnation (as
described in [Bell 2005]), is centred around the concept of boolean-valued
sets, which are functions into a complete boolean algebra. Boolean-valued
sets have been studied mostly with the aim of proving set theoretic in-
dependence results. Here I want to consider structures of boolean-valued
sets from ametaphysical perspective. I will argue that boolean-valued sets
can be seen as arbitrary objects in the sense of [Fine 1985] and [Horsten 2019].
Indeed, Fine himself suggested that arbitrary object theory might be ap-
plicable to the boolean-valued approach to forcing [Fine 1985, p. 45–46],
although his suggestion has hitherto not been followed up.
I will develop themetaphysical hypothesis that there is a sense inwhich
the set theoretic universe itself is also an arbitrary entity. On the view that
I explore, there is only one mathematical universe. But just as the elements
in it, the set theoretic universe as a whole is an arbitrary entity. And just as
the arbitrary sets in the universe can be in different states, the set theoretic
universe can also be in many mutually incompatible states.
In this article the the boolean algebra-approach to forcing is used as a
tool to express a metaphysical view. Given the mathematical equivalence
of the boolean algebra-approach and the partial order-approach (“poset-
approach”) to set forcing, the metaphysical view that I want to explore can
also be expressed using the partial order-approach, but I will not do so
here. For class forcing, the two approaches are not mathematically equiva-
lent.1 Also from a philosophical view the situation becomes more compli-
cated if we take proper classes ontologically seriously. In this article, I will
leave these matters aside.
The proposal that is explored in this article is tentative, and is deliber-
ately kept “open” at several junctures. That is, there are multiple ways in
1See [Antos et al, forthc].
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which it can be developed more fully. This is just because at this point I
am unsure what the best way is of fleshing out my proposal in a detailed
way.
The structure of this article is as follows. First, I review key elements
of the theory of arbitrary objects. Then I will show how in an obvious way
arbitrary objects play a role in the model that is described in [Scott 1967],
which is the oldest incarnation of the boolean-valued models approach to
forcing. Then I will show how arbitrary object theory can also be used to
give a metaphysical interpretation of ‘modern’ boolean-valued models.
In what follows I use standard notation as much as possible. Mostly,
notation will be as in [Bell 2005]. In particular, concerning algebraic no-
tions, I denote the join, meet, and complementation operations as ∨, ∧,
and c, respectively, and I denote the top and bottom elements of an alge-
bra as 1 and 0, respectively.
2 Arbitrary objects
An arbitrary F is an abstract object that can be in a state of being some or
other F. We may say that an arbitrary F coincideswith some F in a state, or
takes a certain value in some state. So, mathematically, an arbitrary F can
be modelled as a function
f : Ω → F,
where Ω is a state space, and F is a collection of objects. In order to develop
a basic feeling for what arbitrary objects are like, let us briefly consider a
few simple examples.
Example 1 Consider the man on the Clapham omnibus. Such an arbitrary
object could (in some sense) be me, or it could be my next door neighbour. But
this arbitrary object is neither numerically identical with me, nor with my next
door neighbour.
Example 2 Consider an arbitrary natural number. Such an arbitrary object
can be in the state of being the number 3, but it can also be in the state of being
the number 4.
Typically, for a property F, there are more than one arbitrary F’s.2 For
2Fine holds that for every F, there is ultimately is no more than one “independent”
arbitrary F [Fine 1983, p. 69]. I will not make this assumption here.
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instance, consider an arbitrary natural number a1 strictly between 3 and 6.
Then there is also another arbitrary natural number strictly between 3 and
6, call it a2, which in every state differs from a1. So, for instance, in a state
where a1 takes the value 4, a2 takes the value 5. This shows that arbitrary
F’s can be correlatedwith each other.3
It has been argued, a.o. by Frege,4 that there are no arbitrary objects,
and this seems still to be the prevailing view. But in the spirit of [Fine 1985]
and [Horsten 2019], I will take arbitrary objects ontologically seriously.
The aim of this article is not to argue for this metaphysical stance.
In many cases, the function range of an arbitrary F, when regarded
as a function, consists of specific objects. For instance, in a state where a1
coincides with the number 4, it takes a specific value. But there are also
arbitrary objects that can be in a state of being this or that arbitrary object.
For instance, an arbitrary arbitrary natural number strictly between 3 and
6 can be in a state of being the arbitrary number a1, but it can also being in
a state of being the arbitrary number a2. Such higher-order arbitrariness
will play an important role in what follows.
I will also be liberal in not just considering maximally specific state
descriptions (also known as possible worlds). Instead, I will also permit as
states situations that are less than fully specified: call them partial states.
These partial states can then be modelled as sets of possible worlds.
3 Forcing and random variables
In early work on boolean-valued models, random variables play an impor-
tant role. In particular, this is so in the first exposition of the method of
boolean-valued models, Scott’s beautiful article A proof of the independence
of the continuum hypothesis [Scott 1967].
Scott starts his construction of boolean-valued models with a probabil-
ity triple 〈Ω,A, P〉, where Ω is a state space, A is a σ-algebra on Ω, and P
is a probability function defined on A. This probability triple is the back-
ground of the notion of a random real over Ω, where a random real over Ω
is a function
ξ : Ω → R
3Note that this means that it is strictly speaking wrong to speak of the man on the
Clapham omnibus.
4See [Frege 1904].
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that satisfies some measurability constraint.5 Let R be the collection of
random reals. It is easy to see that R is canonically embedded in R (by
constant functions).
Scott’s aim is, roughly, to construct a boolean-valued analogue of the
classical rank Vω+2, which is the level of the iterative hierarchy where the
continuum hypothesis (CH) is decided. In this boolean-valued model the
axioms of set theory insofar as they describe Vω+2, turn out to be true,
whereas CH is false in this model.
The language in which Scott describes the initial transfinite levels of the
iterative hierarchy has a type-theoretic flavour.6 In particular, it contains
variables ranging over real numbers, and variables ranging over functions
on the reals. The set of natural numbers N is defined in this language as a
special collection of reals [Scott 1967, p. 95].
In the resulting model S , the real number variables range over random
reals (as defined above). The function variables range over a set RR of
functions from R toR that meet an extensionality condition.7
In the boolean-valued model S , sentences of the language take values
in a complete boolean algebra B, which is obtained from the boolean σ-
algebraA by identifying events that differ from each other only by a set of
probability 0 (as measured by the probability function P):
B = A/(P = 0).
Moreover, B can be seen to have the countable chain condition, which en-
tails that B is complete.
Then Scott chooses Ω in such a way that S contains many random reals
that are “orthogonal” to each other. This ensures that S |= ¬CH, where |=
is the boolean-valued truth relation. In particular, the “degree” to which two
random reals ξ and η coincide according to S is “measured” by a boolean
value, i.e., an element of B. And such an element of B can roughly8 be taken
to be the set of states on which ξ and η coincide.
5In particular, it is required that for each r ∈ R :
{ω ∈ Ω : ξ(ω) ≤ r}
is measurable.
6But this is not essential for his argument, as Scott himself observes.
7See [Scott 1967, p. 102].
8I.e., up to P = 0 difference.
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Now S only verifies the usual set theoretic axioms as far as Vω+2 goes.
But Scott sketches how S can fairly routinely be extended to a boolean-
valued model of ZFC that still makes CH false.
As objects that take values in states, Scott’s random reals are arbitrary
objects in the sense of [Fine 1985] and [Horsten 2019]9 (or at least they are
modelled in the same way). But the values of function variables are not nat-
ural modellings of arbitrary objects. Going up the hierarchy, functionals,
etcetera, are also not arbitrary objects. This “non-uniformity” is eliminated
in later versions of boolean-valuedmodel theory, such as [Bell 2005], as we
will see shortly.
The take-away message is that arbitrary objects have played a role in
boolean-valued models from the start. Random variables in Scott’s sense
havemostly disappeared frommodern treatments of boolean-valuedmod-
els,10 and Scott himself already observed that his method for proving the
independence of the continuum hypothesis does not really require them
[Scott 1967, p. 110]. Nevertheless, I will argue that in more recent versions
of boolean-valued model theory, arbitrary objects play an even more per-
vasive role, albeit in a somewhat less obvious way.
4 Boolean-valued sets as arbitrary objects
Let us now turn to the contemporary approach to boolean-valued models,
as described in [Bell 2005].
A boolean-valued class model V(B) consists of functions
u : V(B) → B,
where B is a complete Boolean algebra. dom(u) can be seen as the quasi-
elements of u. And the elements of dom(u) are themselves boolean-valued
sets [Bell 2005, p. 21]. This is reflected in the recursive build-up of the
universe V(B) of boolean-valued sets.
Given the Stone representation theorem, the boolean algebra B can be
conceived of as a field of sets.11 Each element of B can then be seen as
a set of possible worlds, i.e., a partial (or total) state. In other words, B is
9See in particular [Horsten 2019, chapter 10].
10But not entirely: see for instance [Krajı´cˇek 2011].
11Uniquely so if B is atomic.
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an algebra of states, where the join operation expresses union of states (‘a
or b’). If in B we have a < b, then the state a is a refinement of state b.
The algebra B need not be atomic: there may be no maximally specific
states (‘state descriptions’ in the Carnapian sense). Partitions of unity (as
particular anti-chains in B) are then especially significant as collections of
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive sets of states. In the absence of
atomicity, partitions of unity are the the closest counterparts to the set of
all Carnapian possible worlds.
Actuality plays no role in the picture. Just as it makes no sense to ask
which state the fair coin (an arbitrary object!) is actually in (heads or tails),
there is no state thatV(B) is actually in. There are just many states thatV(B)
can be in. Certainly the maximally unspecific top element 1 ∈ B should not
be seen as the actual world. If there are no atoms in B, then there is not
even a candidate of being the actual world in the Carnapian sense.
Let us consider identity and elementhood in some more detail. We
define [Bell 2005, p. 23, 1.15]:
[[u ∈ v]]B ≡
∨
y∈dom(v)
(v(y) ∧ [[y = u]]B). (1)
This is what it means for some boolean-valued set u to be to some extent a
member of the boolean-valued set v. The extent is measured by a boolean
value.
Given extensionality, identity and elementhood are intertwined in set
theory: identity also constitutively depends on elementhood. So in the
boolean-valued framework we have [Bell 2005, p. 23, 1.16]:
[[u = v]]B ≡
∧
y∈dom(v)
(v(y) ⇒ [[y ∈ u]]B) ∧
∧
y∈dom(u)
(u(y) ⇒ [[y ∈ v]]B), (2)
where x ⇒ y is an abbreviation of xc ∨ y (with c being the complementa-
tion operation of B).
The boolean-valued truth conditions of non-atomic statements are ex-
actly what you would expect [Bell 2005, p. 22], so there is no need to con-
sider spell them out here. This determines a notion of boolean-valued
truth. From now on I will write V(B) |= φ for [[φ]]B = 1.
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Now I want to argue that all elements of V(B) can straightforwardly
be seen as arbitrary objects. Thus the non-uniformity of Scott’s model,
where the range of the first-order quantifiers is somehow distinguished, is
eliminated.
We have seen that B can be seen as a state space. But given that boolean-
valued sets are functions u : V(B) → B, boolean-valued sets are arrows
that “point in the wrong direction” for being arbitrary objects. Their do-
main, rather than their range, should be a state space.
But we will see that this problem can easily be remedied. First I explain
how V(B) itself can be seen as an arbitrary entity. Then I describe how the
elements of V(B) can also be seen as arbitrary objects.
Let us call a ‘partial’ state a situation. Then a maximal anti-chain is a
collection of mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive situations. Every
situation a can, as we will see shortly, itself be seen as a boolean-valued
universe V
(B)
a . In particular, V
(B)
a will make all the principles of ZFC true.
So if {a1, . . . , ak, . . .} is a maximal anti-chain (partition of unity) in V
(B),
then V(B) can be in the state of being V
(B)
ak . More precisely: in the situation
ak, the set theoretic universe is in the state of being V
(B)
ak .
Consider a boolean-valued set u ∈ V(B). Then for each situation ak, u
“is” a boolean-valued set uak at ak, where uak is defined as follows:
• For all s ∈ dom(u) with u(s) ∧ ak 6= 0:
uak(s) ≡ ak ∧ u(s);
• For all s ∈ dom(u) with u(s) ∧ ak = 0:
uak(s) ↾ .
Now we can say exactly what V
(B)
a is, for any a ∈ B: it is the boolean-
valued class model generated by the boolean algebra Ba that consists of all
elements of the form y∧ a, with y ∈ B, and which is such that for x, y ∈ Ba,
x ⋆ y is the same as x ⋆ y in B for ⋆ ∈ {∧,∨}, and xc in Ba is xc ∧ a in B.
Then if B is a complete boolean algebra, so is the restricted algebra Ba.
If B has the countable chain condition, then Ba has it also. And observe
that for all a ∈ B, V
(B)
a |= ZFC. On the other hand, the structure V
(B)
might be such that neither CH nor ¬CH is true in it, but that it could be in
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a state where CH is true and it could be in a state where CH is false. Such
a V(B) could function as a toy model of a set theoretic universe in which
neither CH nor ¬CH is true.
Let us now turn to the problem of “reversing the arrows”.
Definition 1 For any u ∈ V(B), u∗ is the function such u∗(a) = ua for every
a ∈ B.
Proposition 1
1. u∗ is uniquely determined by u;
2. u is uniquely determined by u∗.
Proof. Clause 1 follows from definition 1.
Clause 2. of the proposition follows because u = u1 (where 1 is, as before, the top
element of B).
So whether we take V(B) to consists of boolean-valued sets u or their
counterparts u∗ makes no mathematical difference. But the u∗’s are func-
tions from the state space B to V(B). Therefore they are arbitrary objects,
or, to be philosophically more correct, they are natural representations of
arbitrary objects. Thus we can regard every u ∈ V(B) as an arbitrary object
in the sense of section 2. More in particular:
• the u∗’s are total arbitrary objects (since dom(u∗) = B);
• the state space B of the u∗’s consists mostly of partial states (since
typically the algebra B will be non-atomic).
In category theoretic terms, what we are doing is treating Boolean-
valued sets as variable sets. Given a boolean algebra B, one can consider
the category Shv(B) of sheaves over B. Then it can be shown that Shv(B)
and V(B) are equivalent as categories [Bell 2005, p. 180].12
Thus both V(B) and boolean-valued sets u in V(B) are arbitrary objects
in the following sense. If the boolean algebra B is atomless, then as we “go
12Thanks to Toby Meadows for drawing my attention to this. The connection between
sheaf theory and arbitrary object theory was already observed by Fine: see [Fine 1985,
p. 47].
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down” B, the universe V(B) takes a more specific state V
(B)
a , without ever
reaching a maximally specific state. Likewise, as we go down B, a typical
boolean-valued set u takes a more specific state ua, without ever reaching
a maximally specific state.
5 Kaleidoscopic absolutism
We have seen how boolean-valued universes, and the sets that they con-
tain, can be seen as arbitrary objects. Now I will argue that the set theoretic
universe as a whole can itself be seen as an arbitrary entity. The slogan is,
roughly:
The set theoretic universe is the arbitrary V(B).
Let us designate the arbitrary V(B) as B. The value-range of this arbitrary
entity B will range over V(B)’s where B is an element of a large collection
of complete Boolean algebras.
Like all slogans, this one has to be taken with a grain of salt. The thesis
is not that the set theoretic universe is an entity that can be in the state of
being this or that V(B). After all, just as it is unreasonable to hold that the
number 19 is some pure set or other, so it is unreasonable to maintain that
the set theoretic universe can be in a state of being some V(B). The point is
rather that it can be in states that are structurally like, or can be fruitfully
modelled as, V(B)’s.13
It is sometimes argued that there are different, equally valid concepts
of set, and that it is somehow indeterminate which of these notions is de-
scribed in set theory. The position that I am putting forward here is not
intended as an articulation of this view. The thought that I am trying to
develop is not that two states of the set theoretic universe describe differ-
ent set concepts. Rather, the view is that there is one conception of set that
the set theoretic universe answers to: a notion of set as an arbitrary object.
The central component of the proposed view consists of truth defini-
tions for the formulas of the language of set theory (LZFC). I have sketched
13You might ask: can we not “complete” the value range of B to a complete boolean
algebra B and take the set theoretic universe to be (structurally like) V(B)? But this does
not work. As is pointed out for instance in [Antos et al, forthc], B is a hyperclass, and
V(B) therefore does not make ZFC true.
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the definition of truth in a boolean-valued structure in section 4. But a nat-
ural definition of truth in the set theoretic universe, seen as the arbitrary
entity B, can also be given:
B |= ϕ =: for all B in the value range of B : V(B) |= ϕ.
A Tarskian truth definition for LZFC cannot be given in LZFC; but we can
give a Tarskian truth theory for LZFC in an extended language. Similarly,
we can give a boolean-valued truth theory for LZFC in the stronger meta-
language L+ZFC, which consists of LZFC plus a primitive satisfaction pred-
icate. And we can of course also in an extended language express the
definition of truth in B we have given above. In the boolean-valued truth
definition, boolean-valued sets are assigned to variables. Moreover, these
boolean-valued sets are (in the truth definition) applied to other boolean-
valued sets, boolean operations are applied to values of boolean-valued
sets, and so on. But every boolean-valued set can be seen as an arbitrary
object. So we could re-write the boolean-valued truth definition in terms
of arbitrary objects instead of boolean-valued sets—although I will not do
so here. Thus, ultimately, the view that is suggested presupposes an inde-
pendent grasp of arbitrary objects, states, and values of arbitrary objects.
In this sense, the boolean-valued truth theory for LZFC is intended to be
interpreted in arbitrary object theory, which is a part of metaphysics. The
idea is that L+ZFC is itself interpreted as being about arbitrary entities.
Since the view that is proposed is meant to be a foundational interpre-
tation, it must be autonomous14. It must stand on its own two legs: it must
not be parasitic on any other foundational interpretation.
At this point you might worry that the autonomy requirement is not
satisfied: the boolean-valued sets (and hence also the arbitrary objects) to
which the account appeals are defined (recursively) in terms of quantifi-
cation over V (over the “{0, 1}-valued sets”), not in terms of quantifica-
tion over V(B). But this concern is misguided. The boolean-valued truth
definition is given in a language (L+ZFC), the quantifiers of which range over
arbitrary sets. Of course, in order to spell out the truth definition for L+ZFC,
we would have to move to an even richer metalanguage. And, of course,
the {0, 1}-valued sets are, on the proposed view, special cases of boolean-
valued sets: the “traditional” universeV is canonically represented inV(B)
[Bell 2005, p. 30]. So the view is metaphysically self-contained.
14In the sense of [Linnebo & Pettigrew 2011].
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On the proposed view, B is the “ultimate” set theoretic universe. In
this sense, an absolutist interpretation of set theory is proposed. Neverthe-
less, there is an obvious connection with multiverse views such as that of
[Hamkins 2012], [Steel 2014], [Va¨a¨na¨nen 2014]. We have seen how every
state that B can be in determines a boolean-valued set theoretic universe
V(B). Moreover, if we take an anti-chain A in B, then every a ∈ A de-
termines a set-theoretic universe. In this sense, the set theoretic universe
contains many ‘multiverses’. So the position under consideration can be
labeled kaleidoscopic absolutism.15
As a foundational mathematical theory, set theory must be sufficiently
rich to carry out all of accepted mathematics, albeit sometimes in an ex-
ceedingly cumbersome way. Thus, in a naturalistic spirit, I take it as a
conditio sine qua non that the set-theoretic universe makes ZFC true, and
we have seen that B does this.
As mentioned before, there is a 2-valued universe V that is canonically
embedded in every V(B). But the idea is that our mathematical experi-
ence suggests that the set theoretic world is not such a 2-valued structure
[Hamkins 2012, p. 418]:
[The] abundance of set-theoretic possibilities poses a serious
difficulty for the universe view, for if one holds that there is a
single absolute background concept of set, then one must ex-
plain or explain away as imaginary all of the alternative uni-
verses that set theorists seem to have constructed. This seems a
difficult task, for we have a robust experience in those worlds,
and they appear fully set theoretic to us.
Hamkins takes the independence phenomena to be evidence for his mul-
tiverse view; I take them to be evidence for the kaleidoscopic absolutist
view.
Nevertheless, on the proposed view, the completely determinate and
canonically embedded structure V clearly is of theoretical interest. For
instance, we of course have V |= CH or V |= ¬CH, but we don’t know
which.
One might wonder whether it is reasonable to expect V to be a state of
(some, or even every) V(B). If it is, then B will have at least one atom a,
15Themultiverses inV(B) (determined by anti-chains) can be turned into multiverses of
classical, two-valued universes by well-known ultrafilter techniques [Bell 2005, chapter
4].
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and V = V
(B)
a . So then V
(B), and therefore also B, will contain at lest one
maximally specific state, i.e., a possible world in the Carnapian sense of
the word. There are, however, reasons for believing that V is not a state of
a V(B). If for some a ∈ B, V = V
(B)
a , then there is at least one completely
classical state that the set theoretic universe can be in. Moreover, this state
is then also the only fully determinate state that the set theoretic universe
can be in. Set theoretic experience provides no reason to think that there
is any such super-special universe that the set theoretic universe can be.
It is then still the case that in L+ZFC we can define the classical class model
V in a particularly simple way. But from a foundational perspective, this
defined class has no special significance.
The general picture is as follows. Set theoretic experience (forcing,
large cardinal axioms, infinitary combinatorics,. . .) suggests that there are
many states that the set theoretic universe can be in. So B has to be such
that it can be in all and only those states. And this imposes restrictions on
what V is like and what B is like.
Since we want universes with large cardinals to be possibilities, we
probably do not want V to be Go¨del’s constructive universe L. Indeed,
perhaps it can be argued that V contains (many) large cardinals. We have
seen that any B should probably not the {0, 1}-algebra. I have also argued
that B is non-atomic. Beyond this, matters are less clear.
6 Identity
In boolean-valued models we can have [[ξ = η]] = a for some boolean
value 0 < a < 1. So it seems that we are committing ourselves to identity
being to some degree an indeterminate relation.
Evans held that indeterminacy of identity is incoherent [Evans 1978].
His argument is a simple reductio based on Leibniz’ principle of the indis-
cernibility of identicals. Consider any ξ and η that are not determinately
identical. Then ξ has a property, viz. being identical to ξ, that η does not
have. So ξ and η are determinately different from each other.
It has been observed that, strictly speaking, Evans’ argument does not
go through. In Evans’ argument, Leibniz’ principle is applied to the pred-
icate λz[z is identical with ξ]. But then we can only conclude that ξ and η
are not identical, not that they are determinately non-identical.
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However, Williamson ([Williamson 2005, section 8]) has shown how an
Evans-like argument nonetheless can be carried through with the use of
two further plausible principles. First, the following inference rule seems
valid:
“From a proof of φ → ψ, infer that if it is determinately the case
that φ, then it is determinately the case that ψ.”
Moreover, if it is determinately the case that φ, then ψ. Using these proof
principles, Evans’ argument can validly be strengthened to conclude that
there can be no ξ, η, such that (1) it is determinately the case that they are
not determinately identical and (2) it is also determinately the case that
they are not determinately different.
The moral that is often taken from arguments such as these is that there
is no ontological vagueness but only semantic vagueness. That is, I sur-
mise, also the attitude that set theorists habitually take, and it is perhaps
the main reason why the V(B)’s other than V are not taken to be candi-
dates for being the ‘real’ mathematical universe. Indeed, in the forcing
poset approach, the vagueness involved is pretty much officially regarded
as semantic in nature, for its counterparts of the ‘ontologically vague’ sets
in the boolean-valued approach are the P-names [Kunen 1980, chapter 7,
§2].
I believe that the received view that there is only semantic (and epis-
temic) vagueness, is correct. I will now argue that this view is compatible
with the foundational proposal that is explored in the present article.
Clearly there are many pairs ξ, η of boolean-valued sets that are not
numerically identical to each other but that are “judged” to be identical by
certain boolean-valued models. Here is a simple example:
Example 3 Consider the simple boolean algebra B0 = {0, a, b, 1} with 0 <
a, b < 1 and a⊥b. Let ξ = {∅ → 1, (∅ → 1) → 1}, meaning that dom(ξ) =
{∅,∅ → 1} and ξ(∅) = ξ(∅ → 1) = 1. Moreover, let η = {u → 1, v → 1},
with u and v being the following “anti-correlated” sets:
• u = {∅ → a, (∅ → 1) → b};
• v = {∅ → b, (∅ → 1) → a}.
Then clearly we have, in the strict sense, ξ 6= η. Nonetheless, a routine but
tedious calculation shows that V(B0) |= ξ = η.
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In a boolean-valued class model, the identity symbol ‘=’ expresses a
congruence relation other than the real identity relation: it ‘measures’ the
states in which its arguments coincide. On the proposal under consider-
ation, some boolean-valued class model is a good interpretation of the
language of set theory. Therefore the proposed view is committed to the
claim that in set theory, the symbol ‘=’ does not express the real identity
relation. As a consequence, it is not threatened by Evans’ argument, nor
by Williamson’s modification of it.
It is at the metaphysical level, i.e., in arbitrary object theory, that we
truthfully say that ξ 6= η; in set theory, we truthfully say that ξ = η.
So in these two contexts we do not use the identity symbol with the same
meaning. From the debate about mathematical structuralism we are famil-
iar with the claim that in many areas of mathematics the identity symbol
is commonly not used to express the metaphysical relation of identity—
remember the slogan“identity is isomorphism”. Set theory, as a founda-
tional discipline, is often taken to be an exception to this phenomenon.
On the view that is explored in the present article, this is not correct: the
identity symbol in set theory also expresses a relation that is different from
“real” identity.
7 Closing remarks
On the view that I have sketched, there is a mathematical universe. More-
over, as an arbitrary entity, the universe is an abstract entity. To conclude, it
seems natural to say that on the proposed conception the universe is mind-
independent. The combination of these three commitments makes the po-
sition under consideration a form of mathematical platonism. At the same
time, this position rejects a strong form of truth value realism according
to which every set-theoretic statement has exactly one of the traditional
truth values (true, false). However, it is now fairly generally recognised
that mathematical platonism per se is not committed to this extra thesis,
even though most traditional forms of mathematical platonism do sign up
to it.
Versions of set theoretical platonismwithout truth version realism have
been proposed in the literature. In this article, I have suggested one par-
ticular such view that takes the set theoretic universe and the sets in it to
be arbitrary objects.
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I do not claim that the view that I have proposed is the only way in
which forcingmodels canmetaphysically be related to arbitrary object the-
ory. I will close by outlining the contours of an alternative way of seeing
elements of forcing models as arbitrary objects.
The construction of a forcing model is sometimes seen as analogous to
the process of adjoining an object to an algebraic structure.16 For definite-
ness, consider the construction of the ring of polynomials in one variable
over R. In terms of arbitrary object theory, this process can roughly be
seen as follows. We start with an arbitrary object X with value range R.
Then we consider all arbitrary objects that depend on X in the sense of be-
ing polynomially determined by X. The resulting collection of arbitrary
objects form a ring.
Similarly, given a poset P in a model of set theory M, a generic filter G
can be taken to be an arbitrary subset of P. This is the view of Venturi ,
who motivates it as follows [Venturi forthc, p. 2]:
Intuitively a set is generic, with respect to a model M and a
poset P, if it meets all requirements to be a subset of P from
the perspective of M and nothing more. The elements of P,
called conditions, represent partial pieces of information that
will eventually give the full description of the generic G. More-
over, the dense sets that belong to M represent the proper-
ties that a subset of P should eventually have, as considered
from the perspective of M. For this reason, a generic set does
not have a characteristic property that distinguishes it from all
other elements of M.
In terms of this arbitrary subset G of P, a model M[G] can then be seen as
a collection of dependent arbitrary objects.
This way of connecting forcing models with arbitrary object theory
makes use of a distinction between dependent and independent arbitrary ob-
jects. Such a distinction does not figure in the theory of arbitrary objects
that I favour.17 But it is the cornerstone of Fine’s arbitrary object theory. So
the alternative account that I have tried to outline in this section is perhaps
best developed fully within the framework of Fine’s theory. A comparison
16See [Chow 2008, p. 2], for instance.
17Not fundamentally, anyway; but notions of dependence can be defined in my frame-
work: see [Horsten 2019, section 9.4].
16
of this alternative account with the view that was the focal point of this ar-
ticle is left for another occasion.
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